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ADMLmIST4TIVE LA WRE VIEW
The answer to the question, "What is procedure?" depends upon the answer
to another question, "Why do you want to know?"
The line between "substance" and "procedure" shifts as the legal context
changes. 2
INTRODUCTION
In 1790, Congress split its patent power.3 Rather than grant patents
itself by private bill, Congress enacted a general patent law, 4 creating a
patent board in the Executive Branch with the delegated power to grant
patents according to statutorily prescribed standards.5 The Patent Office
(the Office) we know today, created in the 1836 Patent Act,6 received its
broadest grant of regulatory power from Congress in 1870. 7 The terms of
the grant remain the same today: "The Office... may establish
regulations, not inconsistent with law, which ... shall govern the conduct of
proceedings in the Office .... "8 Just how broad is this grant?
It is settled that Congress has given the Patent Office the power to issue
procedural rules for patent examination at the Office, not substantive
1. Thomas Fitzgerald Green,Jr., To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 483 (1940).
2. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (differentiating the substance-
procedure distinction used in applying the Erie doctrine from the substance-procedure
distinction used to test the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Rules
Enabling Act).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
4. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
5. See generally PJ. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18J. PAT. OFF. SOc'v 237
(1936).
6. Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 1 (1998).
7. Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 ("And be itffurther enacted, That
the commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may from time to
time establish rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings
in the patent office.").
8. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006). Before 1999, the provision was found at 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (1994). The scope of the grant on the Patent and Trademark Office's (the Office's)
trademark side is the same. See 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006) ("The Director shall make rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and
Trademark Office under this chapter."). The language dates from the 1905 federal
trademark registration act, Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 26, 33 Stat. 724, 730, and was
preserved in the Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 41, 60 Stat. 427, 440 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).
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rulemaking power of the sort federal agencies typically possess.9 But people
differ sharply over how-or where-to draw the line the Patent Act
demands between proper procedural rules and improper substantive rules.
When the Office asserts that a given rule is procedural and an applicant
blocked from patent rights by the rule contends that it is substantive, the
need for a means to distinguish procedural from substantive rules is plain.
The scope of the Patent Office's procedural power is a pressing question,
as recent events illustrate. The Office groans beneath the weight of a
substantial backlog of applications, built up as the utility patent0
application filing rate doubled between 1998 and 2008.11 Simply
9. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (denying Chevron
deference to a Patent Ofice construction of a patent term extension statute on the ground
that "Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking
power"); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
authority granted in section 6 [now § 2] is directed to the 'conduct of proceedings' before the
Office. A substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the
patent statutes, whether it be section 101, 102, 103, 112 or other section, does not fall within
the usual interpretation of such statutory language."). One may well question whether, as an
original matter, Merck and Quigg provide the sounder construction of § 2(b)(2)(A). Patent
Office "proceedings" are, chiefly, examinations for patentability under the Patent Act's
substantive standards. See 35 U.S.C. § 131. The "conduct of [these] proceedings" could
fairly be thought-at least as a textual matter-to entail Patent Office resolution of any
ambiguities in the Patent Act's substantive patentability standards. Congress, however,
reenacted this grant of regulatory power in 1999, post-Merck, both moving the provision to a
different part of the Patent Act and modifying some of its terms. See Patent and Trademark
Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-572, 1501A-572 to 1501A-573
(1999) (Title IV, Subtitle G, § 4712 of the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, included as Appendix I to an appropriations bill). According
to the Supreme Court's statutory construction jurisprudence, Congress has thereby ratified
Merck's "procedure, not substance" construction of§ 2(b)(2)(A). See Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 220 (2002); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991) (quoting
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986)
(quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974)).
10. U.S. law provides for three types of patents: utility patents, design patents, and
plant patents. Utility patents cover useful, new, and nonobvious products and processes. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103. This is the sort of patent most people think of as, simply, a patent.
Design patents cover new, original, and ornamental designs for "article[s] of manufacture."
35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173. Plant patents cover distinct and new varieties of asexually
reproduced plants. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164. The Patent Office grants many more utility
patents than design or plant patents. For example, during the ten years from 1999 to 2008
inclusive, the Patent Office granted 1,610,289 utility patents (or about 161,000 per year);
180,279 design patents (or about 18,000 per year); and 8,847 plant patents (or about 885 per
year). See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR
YEARs 1963-2009 (Apr. 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/us~stat.pdf (reporting annual application and grant totals).
11. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: Te Patent Office's Troubled OQuest for
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 2051, 2057-60 (2008) (discussing the Patent Office's
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continuing to work as it has in the past is surely not a sustainable strategy.
A package of purportedly ameliorative rules that the Office first announced
in January 2006, and finalized in August 2007,12 never went into effect.
The rules, which struck many patent applicants as too harshly
constricting, 13 stalled in litigation over whether they were substantive and
thus invalid. The trial court, in what is known as the Tafas I case,
concluded that all these new rules were substantive and thus enjoined
them. 14 The Federal Circuit, in the Office's appeal in Tafas II, concluded
that the rules were procedural in a split panel opinion in March 2009.15 In
July 2009, the full Federal Circuit granted en banc review in Tafas III of the
question and vacated the panel opinion. 16 In October 2009, the Office
announced that it was rescinding the proposed rules 17 and settling the
litigation. 18 The fitting scope of the Office's regulatory authority-the issue
at the heart of the Tafas cases-thus remains in doubt. The agency
problems that inspired the rules continue. New rules, likely to trigger
strong objections from at least some of the patent system's repeat players,
"Increased Workload and Backlog").
12. Changes to Practice for Continue Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications,
72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007).
13. See id. at 46,716-17 (reporting objections received during the public comment
period on the draft regulations). The rules purportedly sought to streamline the process
whereby applicants press their claims to utility patent protection over time. Specifically, the
rules, if implemented, would have limited the availability of continuation applications and
requests for continued examination (Final Rules 78 and 114), and-for applications
containing either more than five independent claims or more than twenty-five total claims-
would have required an applicant to submit a new "examination support document," or
ESD, explaining the prior art information presented to the Office (Final Rules 75 and 265).
Id. The reader interested in more detailed discussion of the rules, which is beyond the scope
of this article, should consult Kali Murray, First Things, First. A Principled Approach to Patent
Administrative Law, 42J. MARSHALL L. REv. 29, 30-32 (2008).
14. Tafas v. Dudas (Tafas ), 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), affd sub nom. Tafas v.
Doll (Tafas I/), 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, Tafas v. Doll (Tafas 11) 328
Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal reinstated). Although the plaintiffs in the case-Mr.
Tafas and Smithkline Beecham Corp.-raised several attacks on the rules, the district court
adjudicated only one: "[T]he Court finds that the Final Rules are substantive in nature and
exceed the scope of the USPTO's rulemaking authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)." Id. at
811.
15. Tafasll, 559 F.3d 1345.
16. Tafas III, 328 Fed. App'x 658.
17. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications,
74 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (Oct. 14, 2009).
18. Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds Controversial
Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21 .jsp.
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seem inevitable.19
Thus far, the courts have failed to provide a robust standard for sorting
proposed Patent Office rules into procedure and substance boxes, parsing the
valid from the invalid. Perhaps this should be expected. Procedure and
substance are protean concepts; they "carry no monolithic meaning at once
appropriate to all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to employ
them." 20  Indeed, courts sort the two from one another with different
standards, depending on the reason for sorting them in a given case.
Although it is tough to frame a stable sorting standard for the Patent Office
context, it can and should be done.21 The alternative-fitful ad hocery-
frustrates planning and wastes resources. Thus, the Federal Circuit should
put the scope of the Patent Office's procedural power on firm ground, for
the sake of the Office and patent applicants alike.
The courts have flirted with a range of power-defining options for the
patent law context, most notably the substance-procedure distinction in
notice-and-comment rulemaking conducted under § 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).22 This APA framework, however, is
actually quite ill-suited for the Patent Office. This framework is designed to
protect public participation in rulemaking proceedings conducted by
agencies that-unlike the Patent Office-have the power to make
substantive rules with the force of law (f-they use notice-and-comment) but
can dispense with notice-and-comment for "rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice." 23 Such agencies may be tempted to save time and
19. The press release about the Tafas case settlement speaks in these terms. According
to Director Kappos, "[t]his course of action represents the most efficient way to formally and
permanently move on from these regulations and work with the IP community on new ways to
take on the challenges these regulations were originally designed to address." Id. (emphases added).
20. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 724 (1974).
21. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1105 n.413 (1982) ("But the logical and practical difficulties of classifying a matter as
procedure or substance are not sufficient reason to abandon the enterprise, at least when it is
required by statute.").
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006). In the Tafas litigation, both the district court and the
Federal Circuit discussed the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) substance-procedure
distinction. The Federal Circuit, however, was careful to state that it "d[id] not purport to
set forth a definitive rule for distinguishing between substance and procedure in" that, or
any, case. Tafas H1, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, Tafas 111, 328 Fed.
App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal reinstated).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), 2(A). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947) ("In general, the purpose of
section 4 [now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553] is to guarantee to the public an opportunity to
participate in the rule making process. With stated exceptions, each agency will be required
under this section to give public notice of substantive rules which it proposes to adopt, and to
grant interested persons an opportunity to present their views to it."); see also id. at 9 (listing,
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expense by miscategorizing a substantive rule as procedural.2 4 When a
court later analyzes whether a challenged rule from such an agency is
substantive or procedural, what is really at stake is how--not whether-the
agency can establish the substantive rule it wants. By contrast, the Patent
Office question of interest here is precisely whether the Office can issue a rule
because it is procedural.
This Article identifies a stable standard for sorting procedural from
substantive rules that better fits the way Congress has split responsibility for
granting patents between itself and the Patent Office. The allocation is
straightforward: Under the general-purpose patent regime it established in
1836, and that continues today, Congress sets detailed substantive policy in
the Patent Act to govern the patentability of all patent applications, and the
Patent Office examines individual applications for Patent Act compliance in
proceedings for which it has established procedures by rule. 25 What sorting
standard fits this allocation of responsibility? The key is to recognize that
the way that Congress has split its patent power echoes strongly in the
among the APA's "four basic purposes," the purpose "[t]o provide for public participation
in the rule making process"). "The Attorney General's Manual ... remains the principal guide
to the structure and intent of the APA." ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY
PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 2
(William F. Funk,Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Charles Pou,Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2008).
24. If an agency wants to defend its abbreviated process for generating a challenged
rule on the ground that the rule is merely procedural, the reviewing court's task is-
understandably-to beware an agency attempt to cut this rulemaking corner and thereby
cut the public out of its commenting role. As the D.C. Circuit has put it, "[t]he issue... 'is
one of degree,' and our task is to identify which substantive effects are 'sufficiently grave so
that notice and comment are needed to safeguard the policies underlying the APA."' JEM
Broad. Co. v. FCC (JEM), 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Lamoille Valley R.R.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). On protecting
public participation, see 1 RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.5,
at 351 (4th ed. 2002); on agency temptation to cut corners by misdesignating a substantive
rule as "procedural," see WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 157 (3d ed. 2009).
25. Professor Kerr has described the Patent Office as Congress's contracting agent,
urging that "[t]he patent system operates not through regulation, but rather through the
private law mechanisms of contract, property, and tort." Oin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law
in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 129 (2000). According to Kerr,
[a] lthough Congress generates the offer that the patent laws represent, it cannot itself
review the hundreds of thousands of applications filed every year in response to the
offer. Instead, Congress created the PTO to serve as its agent. The PTO analyzes
the submitted claims on Congress's behalf and determines which applicants have
accepted Congress's offer.
Id. at 138 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 140 ("As an agent hired by Congress, the PTO acts
as an offeror who must determine whether an offeree has triggered a legal obligation by
accepting his offer."). Kerr's contract analogy captures the Office's role.
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pattern Congress later set for federal law generally in 1934, in the Rules
Enabling Act.26 Under the Rules Enabling Act framework, Congress sets
detailed substantive policy governing national law in the United States
Code, and the federal judiciary adjudicates disputes under law in
proceedings for which it has established procedures by rule (such as those
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related rules)2 7
Following this echo back to its source, the courts should, mutatis mutandis,
hold the Patent Office to the same procedural domain under the Patent Act
to which they hold themselves under the Rules Enabling Act. Specifically,
a Patent Office rule that incidentally affects applicants' substantive rights
does not violate § 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act if the rule is reasonably
necessary to establish or preserve the fair and effective patent examination
process that the Office's rules must organize.2 8
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I takes up two preliminary
matters. First, Congress has created the necessity for Patent Office
procedural rules by splitting the patent power's substantive and procedural
parts between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Had Congress
exercised the patent power entirely by itself, in the unified form in which
the Constitution confers it, matters of patent-petition procedure might have
26. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. The Rules Enabling Act is now
codified, in relevant part, at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006):
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereo) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.
27. The Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
coordinates the judiciary's rulemaking process. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006). The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts maintains a helpful set of informal resources on the
rulemaking process at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies.aspx. For a formal
description, with citations, see Daniel R. Coquillette, Scope and Purpose, in 1 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.04 [3] [b], at 1-19 to 1-20 (3d ed. 2009).
Professor Kerr has, in a similar vein, compared the Office's regulatory grant to a trial
court's inherent power to manage its cases. See Kerr, supra note 25, at 166-67 ("Congress
delegated to the PTO a narrowly circumscribed regulatory authority to manage PTO
proceedings, roughly analogous to the power that a federal district court may exercise over
the management of its own cases. Pursuant to this explicit grant of regulatory power, the
PTO Commissioner has promulgated over 300 pages of regulations.... The Federal
Circuit has properly applied deferential standards of review (including Chevron) to such rules,
much like appellate courts afford deferential standards of review to district court trial-
management decisions." (footnotes omitted)).
28. Cf Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) ("Rules which incidentally
affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to
maintain the integrity of that system of rules.").
2011]
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remained less differentiated from matters of patent-policy substance than
they are today. However, having delegated patent application review to
the Office, under a Patent Act text that is much longer on patentability
substance than it is on examination procedure, Congress made Office-
promulgated procedural rules inevitable. Second, it is a truism that
procedural choices affect substantive results. As a consequence, courts
cannot test the validity of Patent Office rules simply according to whether
they affect substantive results. To do so would collapse the very separation
of procedure from substance that Congress established in the Patent Act.
Thus, "affects substance" is the one sorting standard that we know to a
certainOy is incorrect.
Part II explores the Rules Enabling Act model. This model yields a solid
standard for sorting the Patent Office's procedural sheep from substantive
goats. This Part also draws on court oversight of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administration of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,29 administration that-like Patent Office
administration-is limited to the promulgation of procedural rules.30 Part
III shows the unsuitability of two other approaches for distinguishing
procedure from substance-one from the APA context (where ensuring
public participation dominates), and the other from the Rules of Decision
Act3 l context (where preventing forum shopping dominates).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (2006).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) ("The Commission shall have authority from time to
time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter."); Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment
Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutoy Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 51, 56 (observing that "Title VII ... expressly delegated to the agency only the power
to issue procedural rules" and that the Supreme Court "has interpreted Title VII as denying
the EEOC the power to engage in substantive legislative rulemaking").
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) ("The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.").
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I. SPLITTING THE PATENT POWER
The Progress Clause 32 empowers Congress to grant patents to inventors
either directly by private bills, or indirectly by establishing an
administrative system; both approaches "secur[e]" to inventors their
exclusive rights. Inventors immediately began to petition the first Congress
for private patent bills, 33 consistent with the historical practice whereby
state-and, earlier, colonial-legislatures had granted utility patents by
private bills. 34 "As far as the petitioners were concerned, the only effect of
the constitutional clause was to transfer the familiar grant practice to the
federal level." 35
These petitions forced Congress to confront a basic question of patent
system design: "Would it seek to enact individual private laws granting
exclusive patent rights as the states had done, or would it instead enact a
generic law under the authority of the [Progress Clause] ?"36 As Congress
began to work out an answer, it referred the first utility patent petition,
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). Naming this clause presents a
value choice. Some call it the Copyright and Patent Clause, though neither of those terms
appears in it. Others call it the Intellectual Property Clause, though, again, the phrase is
absent, and the word "property," which is used in the Constitution (but not here), abounds
with connotation. Still others call it the Exclusive Rights Clause, which at least has the
virtue of a textual ground; but that name highlights the legal tool it gives Congress to use,
rather than the social goal it empowers Congress to pursue. I call it the Progress Clause.
33. "The First Congress, having opened on March 4, 1789, was only a little more than
a month old when it first received two petitions relating to intellectual property." BRUCE W.
BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 131 (1967). PetitionerJohn
Churchman "claimed that he had invented certain methods of navigation by means of
magnetic variation," and "[h]e asked for the passage of a law vesting in him the exclusive
right to sell in the United States all globes, maps, and tables constructed according to the
principles which he had devised." Id. at 132. Several more petitions for private patent bills
followed. Id. at 133-36; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 81-87 (discussing
congressional receipt and consideration of these early petitions).
34. See generally PJ. Federico, Colonial Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 358
(1929); PJ. Federico, State Patents, 13J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166 (1931). Bugbee also discusses
colonial and state patents at length. See BUGBEE, supra note 33, at 57-68 (discussing colonial
patents), 84-103 (discussing state patents).
35. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became Rzghts and
Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 177, 217 (2004); see also Frank D. Prager, Historic
Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 320 (1961) ("A
number of inventors expected that the new Congress would secure their rights by passing
private laws, one for each of their respective inventions. The states had issued patents in
such form.").
36. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 82-83.
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lodged by John Churchman, to an ad hoc committee of House members.3 7
The committee interviewed Churchman and, reporting that "his ideas on
the subject [of his invention] appear to be ingenious," the committee
recommended that "a law should pass to secure to Mr. Churchman, for a
term of years, the exclusive pecuniary emolument to be derived from the
publication of [his] several inventions." 38 The vital thing to note here is
that the House, in exercising the patent power directly, answered implicit
questions of procedure (e.g., what papers to consider; whether, and how, to
interview the inventor; whether to use one patent to protect multiple
inventions) as well as questions of substance (e.g., what threshold level of
utility, and of ingeniousness, to require). As more petitions arrived in the
House, committee work continued.3 9 Only by enacting a general law in
1790, which directed applicants to a patent board in the Executive Branch,
did Congress spare itself the need to establish regular procedures for
handling what would doubtless have been a rising tide of inventor petitions
seeking utility patents by private bill.
Even after it enacted the first general patent law, Congress continued to
exercise the patent power in an individualized way-specifically, to grant
patent term extensions by private bill for specific patents. "Between 1808
and 1836, eleven private laws were passed granting term extensions for
individual patents."'4 This practice, too, embraced both procedural and
substantive dimensions. Indeed, "[i]n response to numerous petitions for
extension or renewal, Congress in 1832 finally statutorily established the
conditions under which it would consider such petitions." 4 1 Section 2 of the
statute set down requirements about timing, public notice, and the
supporting disclosures:
[A]pplication to Congress to prolong or renew the term of a patent, shall be
made before its expiration, and shall be notified at least once a month, for
three months before its presentation, in two newspapers printing in the city of
Washington .... The petition shall set forth particularly the grounds of the
application. It shall be verified by oath; the evidence in its support may be
taken before any judge or justice of the peace; it shall be accompanied by a
statement of the ascertained value of the discovery, invention, or
improvement, and of the receipts and expenditures of the patentee, so as to
37. Id.
38. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 28-29 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds., 1977).
39. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 84-87.
40. Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical
Perspective, 49J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 19, 52 (2001).
41. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 313.
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exhibit the profit or loss arising therefrom. 42
This procedural statute, which shaped the inputs that Congress would
assess, demonstrates the inevitability of procedural requirements within a
general patent regime for an innovation-hungry, market-driven republic
like our own. And, although this particular statute was long ago repealed, 43
Congress continues to extend the terms of individual patents legislatively,
using whatever procedural and substantive standards it deems best in the
circumstances. 44
The patent power's procedural component did not, of course, disappear
when Congress delegated the review of patent applications to the
Executive. Procedural power flowed, inexorably, to the Executive. For
example, under the 1790 Patent Act, the patent board "gradually
developed a few rules and regulations, as to matters of form as well as to
matters of substance." 45  At its second meeting, the board "instructed
several inventors who were present to provide models of their inventions,"
and it requested more information, in varied forms, from the inventors with
whom it met in the succeeding weeks. 46  Such practices (applicant
interviews, disclosure requests) ripened into regular procedure. Under the
1793 Act, which changed the Executive's role from one of examining
compliance with substantive requirements to one of managing a
registration system (with court review of substantive validity in any later
infringement case),47 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson established a
standard form for the patent document (to which an applicant-drafted
42. Act ofJuly 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 2, 4 Stat. 559, 559.
43. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 21, 5 Stat. 117, 125 (providing "that all acts and
parts of acts heretofore passed on this subject, be, and the same are hereby repealed").
44. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 76-86 (detailing recent private bills and other extension
mechanisms).
45. Federico, supra note 5, at 242.
46. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 179. Walterscheid concludes, from his review of
the extant materials, that "the board seems to have spent a considerable amount of time and
effort trying to get more information from inventors." Id. at 181.
47. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. "Gone was the patent board and
consideration of patent petitions by top-rank cabinet members. Under the 1793 regime,
patents were handled by clerks of the State Department, and by the Patent Office,
established by Madison as a subdivision ... in 1802." Bracha, supra note 35, at 227.
By 1802 it was obvious that patent matters could no longer be handled routinely and
that an administrator of unique ability was needed to oversee their issuance. To this
post Secretary of State James Madison appointed William Thornton... [who] had
both the intellect and the administrative ability needed to guide the fledgling bureau
through its early years. He served until his death in 1828.
Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. Patent Offce, 1790-1836, 5 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 331,334 (1985).
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"schedule" describing the invention would be attached).48 A Patent Office
pamphlet published in 1811 directed the use of a similar basic form.49
Under the 1836 Act, which reinstated a full examination system,
Commissioner Henry Ellsworth quickly published a procedures pamphlet
entitled Information to Persons Having Business to Transact at the Patent Office.50
Ellsworth not only provided information about the new Patent Act, he also
set out rules for applicants--stating, for example, that "[w]hen the
specifications refer to the drawings, duplicates of them are required, as one
must accompany the patent when issued, as explanatory of it, and one must
be kept on file in the office." 51
Admittedly, none of these rules packages approaches the complexity and
detail of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, under which patent
applicants now operate. All, however, show that, from the beginning, the
executive officials empowered to grant applications under our Patent Acts
have established procedural rules for handling those applications fairly and
efficiently.
The Office acted out of necessity in promulgating procedural rules, for
the Patent Acts themselves focused on substantive patentability standards
and top-level features of the patent system, rather than the fine details of
examination procedure. Consider, again, the 1836 Patent Act.52  Its
twenty-one sections occupy approximately eight pages in the Statutes at
Large. In §§ 1 to 4, it creates both the Office and the Commissioner and
clerk positions, and addresses formal matters such as employee oaths and
bonds, the Office seal, and the charge for certified copies of official
documents. Section 5 prescribes the form of the issued patent document.
Section 9 sets application fees, § 10 makes a pending application
inheritable, and § 11 makes a patent assignable by a writing. Sections 14 to
17 address court jurisdiction over infringement suits, as well as the
cognizable defenses and allowable remedies in such cases. Section 19
48. Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of U.S. Patent Documents, 19J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 390, 396-97
(1937) (describing the form); see id. at 408-09 (reproducing the standard form, with an
explanatory memorandum from Secretary Jefferson to Attorney General Edmund
Randolph).
49. WILLIAM THORNTON, PATENTS (1811), reprinted in 6J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 98, 101
(1923).
50. The pamphlet was reprinted, for example, in the August 1836 issue of the Journal of
the American Institute. HENRY L. ELLSwORTH, INFORMATION TO PERSONS HAVING BUSINESS




51. Id. at 588.
52. ActofJuly4, 1836, ch. 357j5 Stat. 117.
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establishes a library for the Office, § 20 obliges the Commissioner to display
the models of inventions the Office receives, and § 21 repeals prior patent
statutes and provides transition rules for pending patent applications and
court actions. In short, the bulk of the Act focuses on matters other than the
details of how the Office is to carry out its primary job, the detailed
examination of patent applications to determine whether they meet
substantive patentability standards.
The core of the 1836 Act-§§ 6 through 8-establishes the substantive
standards for patentability53  and the basic framework for Office
examination of an applicant's eligibility for patent protection.5 4 Section 6
does require the application to be in writing, but says nothing about the
form of that writing. Indeed, it does not even specify the particular
language in which the application should be provided. Section 6 also
requires an applicant to submit drawings "where the nature of the case
admits of drawings" without stating who makes that determination or how
to do so; similarly, it requires an applicant to "furnish a model.., in all
cases which admit of a representation by a model," without providing who
determines the propriety of a model or how to do So. 55 Perhaps most
striking, § 7 sets a basic framework for the Office to examine an application
for patentability, including an applicant's right to respond to an initial
rejection and right to appeal to a board of examiners, but does not state a
single time period, timeline, or deadline for doing so. Section 8 requires the
Office to decide who among interfering applicants to the same subject
matter has priority as the true first inventor, but says nothing about how to
make such a determination. Such bare bones demand more detailed
implementation procedures. 56 If the Office did not provide them, who
would?
Congress, by delegating patent examination to the Executive in broad
terms, made Office-promulgated procedural rules inevitable. The
53. In today's patent law terminology, § 6 requires utility, novelty, and an adequately
detailed supporting disclosure. Cf 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (requiring utiflity), 102 (requiring
novelty), 112 (requiring adequate supporting disclosure).
54. Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6-8, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20.
55. Id. §6.
56. See 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 422, at 8 (1890) ("The proceedings relating to the grant of letters-patent are regulated in
part by the acts of Congress, and in part by rules established by the Patent Office itself.
While the general features of these proceedings may properly be made the subject of
permanent provisions in the statutes, their numerous and ever varying details can be
controlled only by the vigilant and flexible authority of the department in which they arise.
For this reason power has been conferred upon the Commissioner of Patents to adopt such
regulations as he may deem expedient for the conduct of the business committed to his
charge.").
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regulatory grant in the 1870 Patent Act was, in a sense, simply an
acknowledgment of facts already on the ground: "The 1870 [Patent Office]
rules, although they professed to be under the amended laws of 1870 ... ,
were quite similar to the rules of 1869." 57 The allocation thereafter, at any
rate, is plain: Congress sets the substantive standards of patentability, and
the Patent Office prescribes procedures for examining applications for
compliance with those patentability standards.
This substance-procedure allocation, like every such allocation,
separates in name things that remain interrelated in fact. It is widely
acknowledged, for example, that "virtually all procedural rules may, and on
occasion do, affect the result of the litigation." 58  As then-Professor
Easterbrook put it, "[s]ubstance and process are intimately related. The
procedures one uses determine how much substance is achieved, and by
whom." 59 For example, "[w]hen the discovery rules were adopted in 1938,
they were expected to make a trial less about sport and ambush, and more
about truth and evidence. 'This presupposed that [those rules] would
change the results in many cases."' 60  Or, to take an example from
contemporary patent law, consider this: the patent application document
that one files with the Patent Office must "[b]e in the English language. 61
This requirement does not appear in the Patent Act. Instead, it originates
from a Patent Office regulation. If it is a valid rule, it is valid because it is
57. Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
(Part I), 64J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 490, 500 (1982); see also LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, THE PATENT
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE GRANTING OF PATENTS: A
HISTORY 50 (1891) ("The law of 1870 ... gave the Commissioner authority, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to establish regulations for the conduct of
proceedings in the Office. As early as 1828 the Office began to print for free distribution
circulars containing information as to what the law relating to the issuing of patents was, and
how to proceed to obtain a patent. These circulars were revised and enlarged from time to
time, as various changes and additions were made in the law affecting the practice before the
Office. The information contained in them was divided into numbered sections and
conveniently arranged under suitable headings. At length these circulars took the form of a
pamphlet, which began to be called the Rules of Practice, but prior to the act of 1870 the
rules did not have the force of law.").
58. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan,J.,
concurring) (observing that "any rule, no matter how clearly 'procedural,' can affect the
outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed"); Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
445 (1946) ("Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and
often do affect the rights of litigants.").
59. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112-13.
60. Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
801, 819 (2010) (quoting Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and its Future, 1
GA. L. REv. 563, 570 (1967)).
61. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b)(1)(ii) (2009).
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not substantive, but procedural, at least for purposes of § 2(b)(2)(A). Of
course, the requirement that applicants present their applications in the
English language is procedural in that it regulates the formal manner in
which an applicant presents her patent claims for examination, in much the
same way that the rules about paper type and margins,62 the sequence of
application components, 63 and drawings64 do. The requirement also has
profound substantive consequences, however, because the numbered claim
paragraphs at the close of every patent define the very substance of the
patentee's right to exclude others from his or her invention. 65 Indeed,
"[t]he first step in any [patent] invalidity or infringement analysis is claim
construction. '66 Choosing English for Patent Office proceedings, then,
plainly contributes to fair and efficient patent examination, and equally
plainly affects the scope of the resulting patent rights.
Procedural choices affect substantive outcomes. As a result, were we to
use the "affects substance" criterion for sorting Patent Office rules into the
substance and procedure categories, the procedure category would collapse to an
empty set. But Congress has explicitly ruled out treating procedure as an
empty set by the very act of splitting the patent power's application-
processing role off from the patentability-defining role and delegating the
former to the Patent Office, along with the power to promulgate procedural
rules. The trial court in Tafas, by leaning so heavily on an "affects
substance" sorting standard,67 sharply curtailed the Office's regulatory
power in the teeth of the Patent Act's basic allocation of responsibilities.
The Federal Circuit panel in Tafas II, by contrast, had the good sense to
reject this antistatutory standard. 68
What sorting standard should the courts use in policing the boundary the
Patent Act creates between valid procedural rules and invalid substantive
62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(a)(l)(i)-(ii).
63. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.75, 1.77.
64. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.83-1.84.
65. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996)
(describing the patent claim's function in defining the scope of the patentee's grant). As one
commentator recently put it, "[a]sk any patent lawyer what the most important part of a
patent is, and the answer will invariably be 'the claims."' Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent
Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523, 524 (2010) (footnote omitted).
66. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
67. Tafas l, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008), affd sub nor. Tafas II, 559 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, Tafas III, 328 Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal
reinstated).
68. See Tafas II, 559 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Substantive rules certainly
'affect individual rights and obligations,' but that inquiry does not necessarily distinguish
most procedural requirements, which will also 'affect individual rights and obligations."'),
vacated en banc, Tafas III, 328 Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal reinstated).
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rules? I take up this question next.
II. FITTING THE BEST MODEL
Common sense and experience indicate that "substance and procedure
differ even if, at the margin, they become difficult to distinguish." 69 They
differ as follows: "Substantive law refers to that body of principles designed
to regulate primary human activity; procedural law refers to that body of
principles designed to provide a means for adjudicating controversies over
rights derived from the substantive law."' 70  Thus, for example, the
requirement that an invention must be nonobvious to be patentable 71 and
the patentee's right to sue an infringer 72 are clearly on the substantive side
of the line, whereas the required use of white paper for a patent
application 73 and the availability of interrogatories in a patent infringement
suit74 are just as clearly on the procedural side of the line.
Some matters, however, "are rationally capable of classification as
either" substance or procedure. 75 They effectively "fall within a twilight
zone between both classifications. ' 76 In this twilight area we see courts
calibrate the standards they use for sorting procedure from substance,
according to the function that sorting serves in a given context.77 My
69. Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 281, 284; see also Edgar H. Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L.
REv. 392, 413 (1941) ("All procedural rules affect substantive rights; the question is one of
degree and, since this cannot practicably be debated in every case, the orthodox distinction
is valuable.").
70. Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversiy Cases: A Critical Guide
to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 82
(1995); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Ageny Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 477 (2002) ("Substantive rules regulate
the primary behavior of parties outside the walls of the issuing agency-addressing how
much pollution they can emit, what they must disclose in proxy statements, and so forth....
Procedural rules, in contrast to substantive rules, govern what happens inside an agency-
how it is organized, how it conducts hearings, and so forth."). Courts describe the
distinction in similar terms. See, e.g., Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 883
(10th Cir. 2006); In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 272 So. 2d 65, 65-66 (Fla. 1972).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
73. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(a)(1)(i) (2009).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
75. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
76. Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450 (1st Cir. 1990). According to
Professor Main, the following "doctrines have long been difficult to classify as either
substantive or procedural: statutes of limitation, testimonial privileges, fee-shifting statutes,
burdens of proof, the availability of equitable relief, and other remedial matters." Main,
supra note 60, at 813- 14 (footnotes omitted).
77. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-74 (differentiating the substance-procedure
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discussion here focuses on these twilight cases, for they are the ones likely to
generate a court challenge.78
What function should courts serve by sorting procedural from substantive
rules in the Patent Office context? A durable answer must begin with the
recognition that Congress has nearly a free hand in determining what it
wants to delegate to the Office as procedure and what it wants to keep for
itself (or delegate to the courts for common law elaboration) as substance.79
And the courts best aid Congress if they support, rather than undermine,
the basic structure of the patent system that the Patent Act creates. As a
result, when an applicant challenges an Office rule under § 2(b)(2)(A), the
court should ask, has the Patent Office improperly invaded the patentability
policy territory of Congress? Or, instead, has the Office properly sought to
establish and preserve a fair and efficient examination system? The courts,
if they attend to the purpose of § 2(b)(2)(A), should tune their sorting
standard so that it preserves this basic allocation of responsibility. Other
bases for distinguishing procedure from substance that arise in different
contexts, such as ensuring public participation in the rulemaking process or
preventing forum shopping in diversity cases, simply do not apply.80
To translate the proper court goal, just described, into a workable legal
standard that the Office and private parties alike can apply, it helps to
distinguish between two distinct errors the Office can make in determining
the validity of a given rule and compare them to the analogous errors a
court can make when adjudicating a challenge to that rule. Thinking about
the possible errors, and possible congressional responses, can highlight
which actor-the Office or the court-is in a better position to evaluate a
rule's procedural bona fides in the same manner Congress would.
Suppose the Office considers changing the examination rules, and it
knows that the change will generate more accuracy gains than process
costs. The Office can adopt the rule, or forbear from adopting the rule.
Congress, in response, can leave the new rule in place, or countermand it
distinction used in applying the Ee doctrine from the substance-procedure distinction used
to test the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Rules Enabling Act).
78. The Patent Office will not promulgate plainly substantive rules, and patent
applicants will not attack plainly procedural rules on § 2 grounds.
79. I concede that, as a formal matter, either Due Process rationality review or the
nondelegation doctrine marks the outer boundary of Congress's power to delegate a portion
of the patent power to the Office. But those boundaries are on the very distant horizon,
given the Patent Act's detailed substantive patentability standards and the Office's
regulatory focus on examination for patentability. As for delegating to the courts the
common law task of elaborating on the broadly phrased substantive patentability and
infringement criteria set forth in the Patent Act, Congress has long done so. See generally
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forns and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51 (2010).
80. See infra Part 111.
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by amending the Patent Act. To simplify the analysis, assume for this
hypothetical that Congress responds, primarily, out of the desire to preserve
the existing allocation of powers between itself and the Office. 81 What
errors could the Office make? And how would Congress respond?
Consider the table below:
Congress would deem The Patent Office...
the rule to be... Adopts a Rule Forbears
Procedural Valid Invalid
Substantive Invalid Valid
The Office can err by forbearing when Congress would not
countermand the change, i.e., by failing to make an efficient change to
examination in the mistaken belief that Congress would view the change as
an invasion of its power to set substantive patent policy. Congress can
correct this error, of course, by enacting the change itself, assuming that
Congress learns about the error; and, were Congress to consider doing so,
the Office (by hypothesis) would support the change in the legislative
process. It is not clear, however, how the courts could correct this type of
error.
8 2
The Office also can err by adopting a rule that Congress would reject, in
the mistaken belief that Congress would not view the change as an invasion
of its preserve of substantive patent policy. Congress can correct this error
by amending the Patent Act, and Congress will learn about the new rule if
it falls especially hard on applicants from a particular technology domain.
The courts, too, can correct this error, in an action against the Office under
the APA. 83
81. Obviously, Congress could respond, or fail to respond, for a host of reasons having
nothing to do with the substance-procedure distinction I analyze here. The existence of
those other potential reasons, however, does not affect my analysis.
82. Perhaps there is a way for a private party to petition the Office to change its rules
and sue if the Office rejected, or failed to act on, the petition. The APA does provide for
review of agency failure to act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(1) (2006). But it is not at all clear
what duty the Office would have violated in such a scenario, and the courts appear to hold
petitioners in this context to a very high, mandamus-like standard. See In re Am. Rivers &
Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Patent Act's directive that
Office regulations "shall facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications," 35
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(C) (2006), does not seem nearly crisp enough to establish a violated duty in a
case where there are good arguments for and against promulgating the proposed rule.
83. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(C). The Tafas case was just such an action. See Tafas 1, 541
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This is not a domain that cries out for judicial second-guessing. The
Office should, if it is concerned with efficiency, minimize the sum of the
expected costs of the two foregoing types of errors. Given the Office's long
success with its procedural rules, and its ongoing relations with its
congressional oversight committees, the Office should have a reasonably
strong sense for what Congress will, and will not, allow. And, putting court
review to one side, the root criterion of what is procedural for Patent Act
purposes is whether "Congress will allow it."
Now assume the Office has gone ahead and actually adopted a new rule
governing patent examination. A court reviewing the rule's validity faces a
profile of potential hits and misses not unlike the one the Office faced. The
court can void the rule or uphold it. The rule itself embodies the Office's
assessment that Congress would deem the new rule to be procedural and
thus leave it intact. In that sense, the imagined reaction of Congress to the
new rule is key to both error profiles. The court, however, is a step further
removed from Congress in this scenario. The court is, in effect, reassessing the
Office's assessment of congressional reaction. Consider the table below:
The Office thinks that Congress The court...
would deem the rule procedural,
and the Office is... Upholds the Rule Voids the Rule
Correct Valid Invalid
Incorrect Invalid Valid
The court can err by voiding a rule that the Office had correctly
surmised Congress would leave in place. The court also can err by
upholding a rule that the Office had incorrectly concluded Congress would
leave in place. Congress can correct either type of court error, at least as to
future applications.
As a doctrinal matter, the Federal Circuit gives Chevron deference8 4 to the
Patent Office's reasonable exercise of the procedural power so long as it is
satisfied that the regulation in question is indeed procedural.8 5 The court,
F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2008), affd sub nom. Tafas II, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
vacated en banc, Tafas III, 328 Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal reinstated).
84. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85. Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Because the
Patent Office is specifically charged with administering statutory provisions relating to 'the
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given its relatively greater distance from Congress, should also embrace
some form of deference on the prior question whether a challenged
regulation is procedural. 86 As a policy matter, court deference makes sense
in light of the Office's superior ability and experience-compared to the
court-to assess whether Congress would view a particular new rule as an
improper invasion of its substantive turf, at least in a case where the Patent
Act is ambiguous. (Where the Act is not ambiguous, the Office and the
courts alike are bound to follow it. 87)
In sum, § 2(b)(2)(A) allocates power between Congress and the Patent
Office. Congress can fend off invasions from the Office. The Office has
long enjoyed success in framing rules that meet with apparent congressional
approval, if the lack of countermands is any indication, and its ongoing
relations with oversight committees give it helpful guidance for staying on
its side of the line between procedure and substance. Courts can play
backstop for Congress, policing the substance-procedure boundary for the
(admittedly unlikely) extreme outlier. These arrangements and the error
profiles they produce suggest that the standard for distinguishing procedure
from substance should give the Office substantial freedom to treat as
procedure the matters in the twilight zone between clear procedure and
clear substance. Put another way, a court should not void a Patent Office
rule as substantive unless it is a rather glaring invasion of Congress's turf
conduct of proceedings in the Office,' we give Chevron deference to its interpretations of those
provisions." (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A))). In Cooper, "the Patent Office ha[d] interpreted
a statutory provision... that created inter partes reexamination and established rules for
inter partes reexamination proceedings before the Patent Office," i.e., that "plainly
'govern[s] the conduct of proceedings in the Office' within the meaning of § 2(b)(2)(A)." Id.
at 1336. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("We hold
that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.").
86. Professor Merrill argues persuasively that Skidmore deference fits well for these
"scope of agency jurisdiction" questions, at least as to typical agencies. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Noondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 2097, 2174-75 (2004). My sense here, by contrast, is that Skidmore, with its focus on a
new regulation's "consistency with earlier and later pronouncements," Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), may bring too heavy a status quo bias to bear on the question
whether a given innovation in the Patent Office examination process runs afoul of the
substance-procedure line in § 2(b)(2)(A). Unprecedented Patent Office filing rates and
backlogs may well call for unprecedented procedural mechanisms. My goal here is to
explore a different model for measuring the reach of the Patent Office's regulatory writ, one
not confined to the Skidmore-Chevron deference continuum.
87. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding,
contra the Patent Office, that the patent term extension provision at 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) is
unambiguous).
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that lacks any credible examination management rationale. And a court
should uphold a rule against a § 2 attack where the Office can explain the
way in which that rule reasonably helps the Office establish or preserve a
fair and effective examination process for applicants, notwithstanding some
incidental effects on applicants' substantive rights.
The courts have not yet used this standard for distinguishing procedure
from substance under the Patent Act. In Tafas H, the Federal Circuit's
most recent effort to articulate a sorting standard, the panel opinion (now
vacated) adapted the APA-based sorting standard the D.C. Circuit used in
JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.88 JEM involved a challenge to a rule the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had issued without notice-and-
comment, i.e., without providing the opportunity for public participation
mandated by § 553 of the APA. According to the Federal Circuit in Tafas
11, adapting JEM,
the Final Rules challenged in this case are procedural. In essence, they
govern the timing of and materials that must be submitted with patent
applications. The Final Rules may "alter the manner in which the parties
present... their viewpoints" to the USPTO, but they do not, on their face,
"foreclose effective opportunity" to present patent applications for
examination. 89
Even though it was "most persuaded in this case by the D.C. Circuit's
approach in jEM,"90 the court was also at pains to underscore that it "d [id]
not purport to set forth a definitive rule for distinguishing between
substance and procedure." 91 Admittedly, the Tafas H panel opinion would
not have had a different bottom-line result if the Federal Circuit had used
the framework I outline above. The case would, however, have provided a
robust standard for future cases, rather than an explicit flight from any
"definitive rule."
It is, of course, fair to ask whether the courts have confronted a
substance-procedure distinction analogous to the Patent Act's, and
whether, in that other domain, the courts afford the procedural rulemaker
the kind of leeway I urge for the Patent Office. The short answer to both
88. ]EM, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
89. Tafas 1[, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009), (quoting JEM, 22 F.3d at 328)
(omission in the original), vacated en banc, Tafas 111, 328 Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(appeal reinstated). I have quite a bit more to say below about JEEM, and about the
substance-procedure distinction that § 553 of the APA creates. See infra Part III.
90. Tafas I, 559 F.3d at 1355.
91. Id. at 1356. One can hope this is judicial humility, rather than an effort-
unconscious or not-to keep case-by-case court review the main event in any major Patent
Office rulemaking process. In any event, both the Office and the public would be better
served by the humility of a clearly stated general standard that they can apply and predict.
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questions is, "yes."
The analogous distinction is the one Congress established in the Rules
Enabling Act (REA),92 first enacted in 1934.93 The literature on the REA is
vast and rich.94 It is not my aim to canvass it in detail here, much less to
take sides in the many nuanced debates it contains. Rather, my goal is
simply to show the way in which the Supreme Court's REA jurisprudence
provides a ready template that fits the sorting function the Patent Act's
structure suggests. The Patent Act is, in effect, a rules enabling act.
One last point before discussing the REA: The legislative history of the
1870 Patent Act-the original source of the § 2 standard-supports the
view that courts should analyze the scope of the Patent Office's power to
make rules for the conduct of proceedings in the Office along the same lines
that courts use to analyze the Supreme Court's power under the REA to
make rules for the conduct of federal litigation. Specifically, during a floor
debate in the House, "Congressman Jenckes, who was the committee
chairman and the sponsor of the pending legislation," 95 described the new
grant of regulatory power to the Office this way:
I]he power which the Commissioner shall have and ought to have shall be
that of regulating the manner in which proceedings shall be conducted in his
office; the rules of court, so to speak, not the rules of decision but of
government.96
At least one congressman, then, thought of the Office's regulatory power as
akin to the power to make rules of court.
The Rules Enabling Act provides both that "[tlhe Supreme Court shall
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
93. Act ofJune 19, 1934, eh. 651, 48 Stat. 1064.
94. The articles I have found especially instructive are as follows: Robert G. Bone,
Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theogy, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 319 (2008); Robert G.
Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy,
87 GEO. LJ. 887 (1999); Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1012; Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677
(2004); Burbank, supra note 21; Carrington, supra note 69; Ely, supra note 20; Ides, supra note
70; Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the
Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1988); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive
Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1998); Martin H.
Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the
Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutoy Implications, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1303 (2006); Martin H.
Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A
Lesson in Statutogy Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 26 (2008); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equi!Y
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 909 (1987).
95. Wamsley, supra note 57, at 494.
96. CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 2856 (1870) (emphasis added).
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have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for
federal trial and appeals courts, and that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 97 "Taken together, the goal of
these two [requirements] is to ensure that any given federal rule is, in fact, a
rule of procedure and not a disguised rule of substantive law."98 In other
words, Congress "intended to allocate lawmaking power between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress." 99 Sound familiar? It tracks
the congressional division of the patent power between the Patent Office
and Congress.
The Court has upheld this delegation of rulemaking power from
Congress.1 ° Summarizing current doctrine, Redish and Amuluru describe
the Supreme Court's broad implementation of the REA-delegated
rulemaking power this way:
Recognizing that the Rules will often have incidental impacts on substantive
concerns, the Court has confined the Act's substantive right limitation to
exclude from its reach primarily procedural rules whose impact beyond the
courthouse walls is merely incidental. This is so, even if that incidental and
unintended substantive impact is substantial.10 '
Generally speaking, the analysis tilts strongly in favor of upholding a
Rule. 02 With this summary in view, it is helpful to trace the major cases
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b). The Rules process also has, as a formal matter, an explicit
window for congressional disapproval of proposed Rules, but there is less to it than meets the
eye. See infia notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
98. Ides, supra note 70, at 30.
99. Burbank, supra note 21, at 1106; see also id. at 1113 ("The purpose of the
procedure/substance dichotomy is... to allocate policy choices-to determine which federal
lawmaking body, the Court or Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally
enforceable rights regarding the matter in question and the content of those rights.");
Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of
the Inherent Power, 91 IowA L. REv. 1147, 1180 (2006) ("The Rules Enabling Act establishes a
detailed mechanism through which the Court may create procedural law with input from
Congress, reserving to Congress the right to enact prospective federal legislation implicating
substantive rights.").
100. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) ("Article I, § 8, cl. 9, authorizes
Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost the founding days of this
country, it has been firmly established that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to
make all laws 'necessary and proper' to their establishment, also may enact laws regulating
the conduct of those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced." (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941)
("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts,
and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make
rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States .... " (footnotes
omitted)).
101. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 94, at 1333 (footnote omitted).
102. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43
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whereby the Court, applying the REA, arrived at this approach to sorting
valid procedural rules from invalid substantive encroachments on
congressional power.
The Supreme Court first considered an REA-based challenge to a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 103 Sibbach
brought a tort claim in diversity in Illinois federal court arising from an
accident that took place in Indiana. The court, upon the defendant's
request, ordered Sibbach to submit to a physical examination by a
physician pursuant to Rule 35. Affirming that the Federal Rules are within
the power of Congress to regulate federal court procedure and to delegate
rulemaking to the courts, and that a valid Rule "has the force of a federal
statute," the Court considered two REA constraints for a valid Rule. 104
Was the Rule one of "practice and procedure"? The Court thought so, 10 5
offering little analysis on the point, and that seems correct: the Rule "was a
rule of practice or procedure in the sense that it provided a method of
discovery directed toward the resolution of an underlying substantive
claim."' 1 6  Did the Rule abridge any substantive right of Sibbach's, in
violation of the REA, even assuming it contradicted her right in Illinois state
court to be free of such a compelled physical examination? 10 7 The Court
thought not:
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.
That the rule[] in question [is] such is admitted.10 8
Rule 35 altered a state procedural rule, not a substantive right. 109 It thus
passed muster under the REA.
(2010) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule
that has come before us. ... Each of these rules had some practical effect on the parties'
ights, but each undeniably regulated only the process for enforcing those rights; none
altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the
court adjudicated either.").
103. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Ides, supra note 70, at 31.
107. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10.
108. Id. at 14; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1442 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting this portion of Sibbach as the foundation of the
framework for analyzing a rule's validity under the Rules Enabling Act (REA)).
109. Professor Ides has described the Sibbach issue this way: "The federal rule at
issue... did not alter the standards of liability pertaining to the primary human activity at
issue in the case; rather, it provided a means for determining whether the defendant was
liable under those standards." Ides, supra note 70, at 82.
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Five years later, in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,"l° the Court
considered its second REA challenge to a federal Rule. Murphree sued
Mississippi Publishing in diversity in Mississippi federal court on a
defamation claim. The case turned on the validity of Rule 4, governing the
process for validly serving a summons. The publisher argued that the Rule
effectively expanded the trial court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
rejected that contention, notwithstanding the reality that "most alterations
of the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of
the litigants.""'1  Did Rule 4 abridge the publisher's substantive rights in
violation of the REA? No, because "it d[id] not operate to abridge.., the
rules of decision by which th[e] court will adjudicate its rights."'1 12 Indeed,
it "relate[d] merely to the manner and the means by which a right to
recover is enforced."11 3  The fact that the Mississippi court with valid
jurisdiction, rather than some other court, would adjudicate Murphree's
claim did not undermine the Rule: "Congress' prohibition of any alteration
of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such
incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new
rules of procedure .... Like Sibbach, Murphree accommodated
rulemaking broadly.
In its 1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer,115 the Court reaffirmed the REA
boundary analysis developed in Sibbach and Murphree.116 Hanna sued in
diversity in Massachusetts federal court on a tort claim arising from a car
accident in South Carolina. 117 Hanna served the deceased defendant's
executor validly under Rule 4, but invalidly under a Massachusetts state
statute applicable to executors.1 18 Quoting the reasoning from Sibbach and
Murphree liberally for support, the Court concluded that the Rule "clearly
passes muster. Prescribing the manner in which a defendant is to be
notified that a suit has been instituted against him, it relates to the practice
and procedure of the district courts." 119 And, after a lengthy discussion
disentangling REA analysis from the Erie doctrine's focus on
"discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
110. 326 U.s. 438 (1946).
111. Id. at 445.
112. Id. at 446.
113. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
114. Id. at 445.
115. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
116. See Kane, supra note 94, at 676.
117. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
118. Id. at 461-62.
119. Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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administration of the laws,"' 120 the Court underscored the wide latitude
rulemakers have under the REA's two constraints. The "congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in th[e] courts"
delegated under the REA "includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,
are rationally capable of classification as either."'121 A matter in the twilight
area between procedure and substance is thus open to regulation by Rule,
so far as the REA constraints are concerned.
The post-Hanna Supreme Court cases follow the Hanna pattern. 122 In
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 123 a defendant railroad company
had removed an Alabama state tort case to federal court. The railroad lost
at trial, "posted a bond to stay the judgment pending appeal," and then lost
again on appeal. 124 The Woods, who had won at trial and on appeal,
moved in the Eleventh Circuit for the Alabama state statute-mandated
affirmance penalty of 10% of the money judgment. Reversing the Eleventh
Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory Alabama statute
conflicted with the discretionary model established in Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.125 Because the federal rule conflicted with the
120. Id. at 468.
121. Id. at 472.
122. For recent REA analyses in the circuit courts, see Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG,
565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1299 (1 1th Cir.
1999). The Supreme Court's most recent REA/Erie decision, though fractured, does not
call the Hanna pattern into doubt. In that case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates. v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), the Court split 5-4 on the threshold question whether
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 conflicted with the New York state statute that defendant
Allstate Insurance sought to apply in a diversity-based federal class action. The majority
concluded the Federal Rule and state statute "flatly contradict each other," id. at 1441,
whereas the dissenters "perceive[d] no unavoidable conflict between" them, id. at 1469
(GinsburgJ., dissenting). The majority itself, however, split 4-1 on the question of how best
to analyze whether Rule 23, having trumped the conflicting state statute, is valid under the
REA. Id. at 1449-51 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
plurality applied Hanna, id. at 1442-43, but there is no majority opinion on the REA
question.
123. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
124. Id. at 2.
125. "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a
separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond,
award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." FED. R. APp. P. 38. The
Rule was amended in 1994 to provide for pre-imposition notice and an opportunity to
respond. Other than that, the present Rule is the same as the one the Court evaluated in
Burlington Northern. See 480 U.S. at 4 ("Entitled 'Damages for delay,' Rule 38 provides: 'If the
court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee."').
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Alabama statute that would otherwise have applied in this diversity case, 126
the Court tested its validity. Did it regulate procedure? Yes: "Federal Rule
38 regulates matters which can reasonably be classified as procedural,
thereby satisfying the constitutional standard for validity.... The choice
made by the drafters of the Federal Rules in favor of a discretionary
procedure affects only the process of enforcing litigants' rights and not the
rights themselves."' 127  Did it abridge a substantive right? No: "The
cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform
and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and procedure
suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do
not violate this [anti-abridgment] provision if reasonably necessary to
maintain the integrity of that system of rules."' 128
Most recently, in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,
Inc., the Court upheld Rule 11 sanctions against a copyright plaintiff who
failed to adequately investigate its infringement claim before filing its case
and requesting a temporary restraining order.129 The sanctioned plaintiff
argued, among other things, that "imposing sanctions against a represented
party that did not act in bad faith violates the Rules Enabling Act."' 30
Noting that this REA challenge "ha[d] a large hurdle to get over," the
Court applied Hanna and Burlington: "There is little doubt that Rule 1 1 is
reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of the system of federal
practice and procedure, and that any effect on substantive rights is
incidental." 131
The pattern is plain. In all these cases there were, of course, reasonable
arguments that the challenged rules were substantive, not procedural. In
that sense, the cases were hard; indeed, the Supreme Court likely would
have refused review had it been otherwise. But in each case the Court gave
wide berth to REA rulemaking. If a rule regulates a matter that one can
reasonably classify as procedural, it is valid under the REA,
notwithstanding incidental effects the rule may have on a litigant's
substantive rights. Congress can, of course, change any rule it likes, either
by stopping a proposed rule from going into force or by passing a
procedural statute that creates a rule directly. 132
126. Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7.
127. Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 5.
129. 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991).
130. Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 552.
132. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010)
("Congress... has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; it can
create exceptions to an individual rule as it sees fit-either by directly amending the rule or
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The courts should verify the procedural bona fides of Patent Office rules
using the same standard. To wit: A Patent Office rule that incidentally
affects applicants' substantive rights nevertheless passes muster under
§ 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act if the rule is reasonably necessary to establish
or preserve the fair and effective patent examination process that the
Office's rules must organize. 133
One might object to adapting the REA sorting standard for use in the
Patent Act context on the ground that the federal court rulemaking process,
unlike the Office's rulemaking process, expressly provides for a period of
congressional review before a new court rule takes effect. According to the
statute,
[t]he Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of
the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective
a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than
December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise
provided by law. 134
One could argue that, under this provision, the failure of Congress to
prevent a rule from taking effect is strong evidence that Congress thinks the
rule is on the right side of the line between procedure and substance. In
Sibbach, in fact, the Supreme Court expressed just this view. 135 This
makeweight has largely vanished from the Court's REA cases, however,
and-although a duly promulgated rule is presumptively valid-there is no
question that a litigant harmed by the rule can challenge its validity.
Moreover, although it disavowed the technique early on, 136 the Court now
uses the REA's bar on changing substantive rights as a policy canon when
by enacting a separate statute overriding it in certain instances.").
133. The Patent Office, in its opening appeal brief at the Federal Circuit in the Tafas II
case, devoted two pages to arguing that the Office's rules were procedural under the REA,
Sibbach, Murphree, and Hanna: "Here, the Final Rules clearly fall on the procedural side of the
line drawn by Hanna." Brief for Appellants at 36-37, Tafas II, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (No. 2008-1352), vacated en banc, Tafas III, 328 Fed. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal
reinstated). This was too little space, it seems, for developing this alternative argument. The
Federal Circuit, in any event, made no mention of the REA theory in the panel opinion.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006). Waiting periods were part of the original REA. Act of
June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.
135. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941). Justice Frankfurter, in dissent,
was quite skeptical of the argument, opining that "to draw any inference of tacit approval
from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality." Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) ("This is not to
suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to
avoid a 'direct collision' with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain
meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis
developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.").
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construing the rules themselves. Specifically, it construes disputed terms in
the rules more narrowly to avoid overstepping the REA's prohibition
against a rule's abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights. 137
This policy canon makes no sense if one takes seriously the idea that
congressional scrutiny from May to December, under the § 2074(a) waiting
period, largely squares the rule's text with existing substantive law. The
policy canon seems, in other words, to acknowledge that congressional
acquiescence is a sign of indifference, not a sign of full vetting by
Congress. 13 8 The fact that the Patent Office promulgates rules without a
formal congressional review period is thus no reason to abjure the REA
framework in the Patent Act context.
Federal law offers another substance-procedure distinction resembling
the one the Patent Act establishes-namely, the EEOC's power to issue
procedural rules (but not substantive rules) under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.139 "The EEOC was created in 1964 with the
enactment of Title VII," and it "has primary enforcement authority over
Title VII," as well as other civil rights statutes. 140  As part of this
enforcement regime, the EEOC investigates charges of unlawful
discrimination that private parties bring to its attention. 141 In a recent case
challenging a rule that the EEOC had promulgated pertaining to the
lodging of charges against an employer, the Supreme Court approached
137. See Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999) (adopting a narrower
construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the ground that, among other things, "this limiting
construction... minimizes potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act, and avoids
serious constitutional concerns"); id. at 845 ("The Rules Enabling Act underscores the need
for caution."); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) ("Rule 23's
requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints, and with the Rules
Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right,' 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)."); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S.
90, 96 (1991) ("Indeed, as a rule of procedure issued pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,
Rule 23.1 cannot be understood to 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive tight."'
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))).
138. In a different context, criticizing the canon against repeal of a statute by
implication, Judge Posner made the point crisply: "Congressmen do not carry the statutes of
the United States around in their heads any more than judges do." Friedrich v. City of
Chicago, 888 F.2d 511,516 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 933 (1991).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) ("The Commission shall have authority from time
to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions
of this subchapter.").
140. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1937, 1941 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (creating the Commission), § 2000e-
5(a) ("The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of
this title.").
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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the substance-procedure distinction in a manner similar to its REA cases.
By way of background, a private party initiates EEOC involvement by
filing a "charge" with the Commission. Under the statute, "[c]harges shall
be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and
be in such form as the Commission requires." 142 The statute also sets time
limits within which a charge must be filed: "within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," or, if the
charging party "has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local
agency with authority to grant or seek relief' from unlawful employment
practices, "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice
that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the
State or local law, whichever is earlier." 143 Title VII does not, however,
make clear whether a charge that is lodged with the EEOC before the
statutory time has run, but is verified by oath or affirmation afler that time
has run, is valid or fatally defective. The EEOC, by regulation, relates a
subsequent verification back to the date the charge was originally filed. I
In Edelman v. Lynchburg College,145 the Supreme Court considered the
validity of the EEOC's regulation treating a later-verified charge as timely.
Edelman, the complaining party, filed his charge with the EEOC 161 days
after the alleged discriminatory event but did not verify it until 313 days
after that event. 46 The Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's
dismissal of Edelman's case, "held that the plain language of the statute
foreclosed the EEOC regulation allowing a later oath to relate back to an
earlier charge."' 47 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "[t]he
statute is ... open to interpretation and the regulation addresses a
legitimate question."' 148 Specifically, as a textual matter,
[s]ection [2000e-5(b)] merely requires the verification of a charge, without
saying when it must be verified; § [2000e-5(e)(1)] provides that a charge must
be filed within a given period, without indicating whether the charge must be
verified when filed. Neither provision incorporates the other so as to give a
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2009) ("A charge may be amended to cure technical defects
or omissions, including failure to verify the charge .... Such amendments... will relate
back to the date the charge was first received.").
145. 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
146. Id. at 109-10. "In Edelman's case, the filing period was 300 days after the alleged
discriminatory practice." Id. at 109.
147. Id.at lO-11.
148. Id. at 113.
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definition by necessary implication. 149
The EEOC bridged this statutory gap in procedure as part of its
mandate to fairly and efficiently deal with the charges it receives. Indeed,
the Court dismissed Lynchburg College's argument that the rule was
impermissibly substantive as "really nothing more than a recast of the plain
language argument" that the Court found unpersuasive. 150 Moreover, as a
policy matter, the Court approved the EEOC's "reasonable" gap-filling
regulation for both "ensur[ing] that the lay complainant, who may not
know enough to verify on filing, will not risk forfeiting his rights
inadvertently" and "look[ing] out for the employer's interest by refusing to
call for any response to an otherwise sufficient complaint until the
verification has been supplied."'' Most importantly, for my purposes, the
Court analogized the EEOC rule to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),
concluding that "if relation back is a good rule for courts of law, it would be
passing strange to call it bad for an administrative agency."' 152 The Court
thus viewed the EEOC's procedural regulation through the same lens it
views the rules the federal courts promulgate under the REA. There is no
reason to approach Patent Office procedural rules any differently.
In sum, the courts should sort procedure from substance in Patent Office
rules using the same basic approach the Supreme Court has used in the
REA context. Specifically, a Patent Office rule that incidentally affects
applicants' substantive rights does not violate § 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act if
the rule is reasonably necessary to establish or preserve the integrity of the
patent examination process that the Office's rules must organize. This
approach, which gives the Office substantial leeway in the twilight zone of
matters that one could rationally classify as procedure or substance,
recognizes the Office's superior ability (relative to the courts) to frame rules
that establish or preserve a fair and efficient examination process without
running afoul of Congress's reserved power over substantive patent policy.
149. Id. at 112.
150. Id. at 113.
151. Id. at 115.
152. Id. at 116 & n.10; see also id. at 123 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("The regulation at issue here, which permits relation back of amendments to charges filed
with the EEOC, is clearly such a procedural regulation. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15
(establishing rules for amendments to pleadings and relation back as part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). Thus, as the Court recognizes, see [Edelman], at 113-114, the
EEOC was exercising authority explicitly delegated to it by Congress when it promulgated
this rule.").
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III. QUITTING THE BAD MODELS
In addition to the REA, two other prominent federal statutes-the
Administrative Procedure Act153 (APA) and the Rules of Decision Act 154
(RDA)-give rise to frameworks for distinguishing procedural from
substantive rules. Each may tempt a court confounded about how best to
analyze a Patent Office rule attacked under § 2(b)(2)(A). Courts should
resist these temptations, for both the APA and RDA sorting standards were
developed to serve goals far removed from that of the Patent Act's aim of
allocating responsibility for different facets of our long-divided patent
power. Before discussing these inapposite frameworks in detail, however, I
explain the idiosyncratic way the Patent Act invokes the APA's rulemaking
requirements.
A. The Patent Act's Reliance on Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
For at least a decade, it has been clear that "the PTO is an 'agency'
subject to the APA's constraints."'155 And for several decades, the Office
has followed the APA's notice-and-comment framework for promulgating
binding rules of practice. 156 Commissioner Caspar Ooms, for example,
speaking at an New York University Law School conference about
administrative law in February 1947, described the Office's past and
planned compliance with the strictures of notice-and-comment rulemaking
under the APA.157  More recently, in 1999, Congress codified that
tradition. At the same time that it moved the longstanding grant of
procedural regulatory power from § 6 to § 2 of the Act, 58 Congress
qualified the grant with an explicit reference to the part of the APA that
establishes notice-and-comment rulemaking. The operative language in
the Patent Act now states as follows:
153. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
155. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) (rejecting the Patent Office's
contention that it was not bound by the standards of appellate review set forth in the APA).
156. See, e.g., Rules of Practice in Patent Cases: Different Inventions in One Application,
14 Fed. Reg. 5279, 5279 (Aug. 25, 1949) (proposing change to Rule 141, inviting comment,
and setting deadline for comments of Sept. 30, 1949); 14 Fed. Reg. 6639, 6639 (Nov. 1,
1949) (finalizing change to Rule 141).
157. Casper W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and the Administrative Procedure Act, 38
TRADEMARK REP. 149, 149 n.*, 153 (1948).
158. See supra note 8.
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The Office... may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which-
(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office; [and]
(B) shall be made in accordance with section 553 of tide 5[.]159
In other words, when it wants to issue a rule to "govern the conduct of
proceedings in the Office" that binds the public and appears among the
formal rules of Patent Office practice in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, the Office must use notice-and-comment rulemaking to
promulgate that rule.
Those familiar with the APA will appreciate that my construction of
§ 2(b)(2) of the Patent Act is, of necessity, purposive rather than literalistic.
This is so because a literalistic reading of the provision would render the
command to adhere to § 553 of the APA an empty gesture, if not an
outright absurdity. Consider: The Federal Circuit has construed
§ 2(b)(2)(A) to confine the Patent Office to making procedural, not
substantive, rules. 160 Section 553 of the APA generally provides that, to
promulgate a rule, an agency must give the public notice of the proposed
rule and an opportunity to comment on the proposal. 16 1 Section 553 also
expressly provides, however, that the requirements for notice-and-comment
do not apply to certain types of rules-namely, "to interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice."' 162 Given that § 553 exempts agency procedural rules from
notice-and-comment, and procedural rules are all that the Patent Office
can promulgate, commanding the Office to comply with § 553 does not
literally require the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking. How, then, to
break out of this logic trap?
The critical distinction that § 2(b)(2) of the Patent Act sets up is the one
between more formal rules that bind members of the general public (i.e.,
patent applicants) and less formal rules, such as guidelines and policy
statements, that do not. The Office frequently issues guidelines and other
guidance documents that help inform the public of the Office's views on
patent law, and, under § 553(b)'s exceptions, the Office can do so without
resort to notice-and-comment. For example, in the wake of the Supreme
Court's recent landmark decision about the patent law doctrine of
159. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006). For the provision that § 2(b)(2)(B) codifies, see the
Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-572,
1501A-573 (1999) (Tide IV, Subtitle G, § 4712 of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, included as Appendix I to an
appropriations bill).
160. See supra note 9.
161. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), 2(A) (emphasis added).
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nonobviousness,163 KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 164 the Patent Office
published a policy document to "assist USPTO personnel to make a proper
determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103 and to provide an
appropriate supporting rationale."'165 By publishing these guidelines, the
Office also informed the public about the Office's perspective-admittedly
nonbinding-on the scope of a core substantive patentability standard. To
modify the formal rules of practice before the Patent Office, by contrast,
the Office must use notice-and-comment rulemaking. Indeed, the Office
proposed the rules challenged in the Tafas cases in just this manner. 166
This construction of § 2 finds support in related Patent Office provisions
and in the legislative history of the 1999 insertion of the reference to § 553.
First, a portion of § 3 of the Patent Act, which was also added in 1999,
states that the Patent Office Director "shall consult with the Patent Public
Advisory Committee... on a regular basis on matters relating to the patent
operations of the Office."' 167 The Patent Public Advisory Committee,
created in 1999, is established in § 5 of the Act, along with a parallel
committee for the trademark side of the Office. 168 Section 3 further states
that the Director "shall consult with the respective Public Advisory
Committee before... proposing to change... patent or trademark
regulations which are subject to the requirement to provide notice and opportuniy for
public comment under section 553 of tide 5.'"169 This mandate presupposes,
163. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
164. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
165. Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103 in
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg.
57,526, 57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007).
166. See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications,
72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007). I have identified at least one other recent federal
statute that appears to work much the same way as the Patent Act's reference to § 553.
Specifically, as part of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109
Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (2006)), Congress created the Office of
Compliance to administer the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2006). Congress also empowered the
Office's Executive Director to "adopt rules governing the procedures of the Office," 2
U.S.C. § 1383(a), and at the same time provided that "[t]he Executive Director shall adopt
[these procedural] rules... in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in
section 553 of title 5," 2 U.S.C. § 1383(b). The provision also lays out some changes from
§ 553, relying on Congressional Record notice rather than Federal Register notice. Id. § 1383(b).
Given that the phrase "in accordance with section 553 of title 5" appears eighty times in the
United States Code (according to my search in Westlaw's USC database), it seems likely there
are additional similar provisions.
167. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(B).
168. 35 U.S.C. § 5.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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then, that at least some patent regulations are subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking under § 553 of the APA. Were one to construe § 2(b)(2)
literalistically, dispensing with any need for notice-and-comment
rulemaking in a puff of logic, one would also render § 3's consultation
command a nullity; it too, would refer to an empty set. Second, the
legislative history of the 1999 enactment shows that, for at least three years
preceding the final bill, both the House and Senate measures on this point
referred not to rules "made in accordance with section 553,"170 but rather
to rules "made after notice and opportunity for full participation by
interested public and private parties,"'171 i.e., notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The legislative history materials do not record the reason for
the surface shift to the text now codified in § 2(b)(2)(B). Whatever the
reason, the best reading of§ 2 is the one that harmonizes it with § 3.172 On
this reading, the Patent Office can bind the public with the procedural rules
it promulgates with the benefit of public comment after adequate notice,
and not otherwise.
B. The APA 's Substance-Procedure Distinction
Section 553 of the APA, as just noted, requires notice-and-comment for
substantive rules but expressly excepts "rules of agency... procedure" from
that mandate. 173 This different treatment for substantive and procedural
agency rules prompts challenges to agency rules alleged to be substantive
but imposed without the requisite notice-and-comment. 174 The courts
adjudicating these challenges have thus developed a jurisprudence
distinguishing procedural from substantive rules for purposes of § 553.
"The problem in this area, as in other areas of law, is that the distinction
between procedure and substance is not always clear."' 75 Indeed, "[g]iven
170. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B).
171. See H.R. 3460, 104th Cong. § 112 (1996); S. 1961, 104th Cong. § 112 (1996); H.R.
400, 105th Cong. § 112 (1997); S. 507, 105th Cong. § 112 (1997); H.R. 1907, 106th Cong.
§ 612 (as introduced by Rep. Coble, May 24, 1999).
172. "Courts have a 'duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions."' Graham Cnty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2010) (quoting
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995)). Indeed, "[s]tatutory construction. . . is a
holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme... because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." United Sav. Ass'n
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 553(A) (2006).
174. See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 6.5, at 353.
175. Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Nancy G. Miller, The APA Procedural Rule Exemption: Lookingfor a
Way to Clear the Air, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 481, 484 (1992); see also GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 297 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that "courts have had difficulty
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the inherent difficulty of the enterprise, the boundary between substantive
rules and procedural rules is likely to remain murky."' 17 6
Murky or not, the § 553 jurisprudence might appear-at least
superficially-to be a helpful resource for distinguishing procedural from
substantive rules in the Patent Office context. "After all," one could reason,
"Patent Act § 2(b)(2) invokes § 553's rulemaking requirements, albeit
idiosyncratically." This surface connection may help explain the Federal
Circuit's cautious flirtation, in the Tafas cases, with the D.C. Circuit's § 553
jurisprudence. 77 Even as it "recognize[d] that the definitions of 'substance'
and 'procedure' in the notice and comment rulemaking context may
embody policy considerations that are not coextensive with the
considerations at issue" in a § 2(b)(2) challenge to a Patent Office rule, the
Tafas II majority found "that these [§ 553] cases are nevertheless helpful to
the task of drawing a similar line between 'substance' and 'procedure' in [a
§ 2(b)(2)] case."1 78
But the § 553 jurisprudence is not helpful for Patent Act cases, any more
than salt water is helpful for quenching thirst. The APA distinguishes
procedural from substantive rules for a purpose quite removed from that of
the Patent Act; the tasks are similar in name alone. In the patent system, to
hold that a rule is substantive is to put it beyond the Patent Office's reach,
to conclude that it invades a matter of substantive patent policy that
Congress has kept for itself. The purpose of the substance-procedure
distinction in the Patent Act is to preserve the division of responsibility that
Congress first put in place in 1836 and that Congress can adequately police
itself. By contrast, in the typical agency context governed by the APA-
where Congress has empowered an agency to issue substantive as well as
procedural rules-to hold that a rule is substantive is to require the agency
to promulgate the rule only with the benefit of public comment after proper
notice. The purpose of the substance-procedure distinction in the APA is
to protect the general public's right to participate in an agency's
formulation of the rules that regulate the public's primary conduct, 179 and
distinguishing exempt rules of 'agency organization, procedure, or practice' (which are
generally known collectively as 'procedural rules') from non-exempt substantive rules").
176. PIERCE, supra note 24, § 6.5, at 353.
177. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
178. Tafas II, 559 F.3d 1345, 1355 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, Tafas III, 328 Fed.
App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (appeal reinstated).
179. See supra note 23; see also Tracy Corel] Hauser, 77Te Administrative Procedure Act,
Procedural Rule Exception to the Notice and Comment Requirement-A Survey of Cases, 5 ADMIN. LJ.
519, 521 (1991) ("Congress enacted section 553 of the APA to make agencies more
accountable to the public."). Indeed,
any interested party who so desires can participate in the ordinary rulemaking
processes.... At least at the level of responding to notice with comments about an
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courts are thus a vital check on agencies. In short, the arc of § 553 bends
toward substance, whereas the arc of § 2 bends toward procedure.
The D.C. Circuit's § 553 cases develop a method for using the
substance-procedure distinction to protect public participation in agency
development of substantive rules. This method, even if a bit "untidy,"'18 0 is
clear enough to rule itself out as an aid in deciding boundary disputes
under Patent Act § 2(b)(2)(B). The best way to dispel the temptation to rely
on these cases when evaluating Patent Office rules is to discuss the cases in
a bit of detail.
The foundational case in this line is Batterton v. Marshall,181 on which the
D.C. Circuit continues to rely. 182 In Batterton, the state of Maryland
challenged a new Department of Labor (DOL) method for calculating a
locality's unemployment rate for purposes of disbursing federal job
program funds.18 3 DOL adopted the new method without using notice-
and-comment rulemaking. 8 4 Maryland attacked the rule as procedurally
defective, and DOL defended it as, among other things, within the
exception to notice-and-comment for procedural rules. The rule was
procedural, in that it provided the procedure for calculating an
unemployment rate from observable variables. But it was also substantive,
in that it gave the rate that dictated the size of a jurisdiction's federal
payment. The court began by "focus[ing] on the underlying purposes of
the procedural requirements at issue," stating that "[t] he essential purpose
of according § 553 notice and comment opportunities is to reintroduce
public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental
authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies. ' 185 In tight of
this protective purpose, "[e]xemptions should be recognized only where the
need for public participation is overcome by good cause to suspend it, or
agency's proposed rule, there are no restrictions or limitations. Doing so requires
parties only to keep abreast of an agency's proposed rules. And such comments need
take no particular form. As a formal matter, then, rulemaking is an entirely open and
inclusive process of decisionmaking.
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 110 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
180. PIERCE, sufpra note 24, § 6.5, at 353.
181. 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
182. See, e.g., James V. Hurson Assoc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Batterton's discussion of the "critical feature" that characterizes procedural rules for
purposes of§ 553).
183. 648 F.2d at 696-99.
184. Id. at 698 ("This new method was never formally announced or published; [the
Department of Labor] simply sent descriptive memoranda announcing the change to
regional commissions and state unemployment security agencies.").
185. Id. at 703.
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where the need is too small to warrant it ... -"186 Public participation is the
default, and departures must be justified. Applying this exemption-wary
approach to the question whether DOL's new method for determining the
unemployment rate was a procedural rule under § 553, the court
acknowledged that "[t] he problem with applying the exception is that many
merely internal agency practices affect parties outside the agency-often in
significant ways."' 187 It framed its test thusly:
A useful articulation of the exemption's critical feature is that it covers
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties,
although it may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or
their viewpoints to the agency.... The exemption cannot apply, however,
where the agency action trenches on substantial private rights and
interests. 188
Puffing examples from prior cases, the court put "a freeze placed on the
processing of applications for radio broadcast stations" and "a directive
specifying that requisite audits be performed by nonagency accountants" on
the procedural side of the line, and deemed it substantive "when drug
producers are subject to new specifications for the kinds of clinical
investigations deemed necessary" for new drug approval and "when motor
carriers are subject to a new method for paying shippers."' 189 Finally,
turning to the new DOL rule for measuring unemployment, the court
concluded that it required public participation and was thus substantive:
Here, recipients of [federal] emergency job program monies are subject to a
new method for determining the one undefined variable in the statutory fund
allocation formula.... The critical question is whether the agency action
jeopardizes the rights and interest of parties, for if it does, it must be subject
to public comment prior to taking effect. As that is the case here, the
exemption [for procedural rules] cannot apply.190
Maryland prevailed in its § 553 challenge.
Three years later, in Lamoille Valley Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission,' 9 1 the D.C. Circuit confronted a § 553 challenge to an expedited
schedule in a proceeding to review a railroad merger. 192 This expedited
schedule "gave competing railroads 60 days (instead of the usual 90) to file
responsive applications," and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
186. Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 707.
188. Id. at 707-08.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 708 (footnote omitted).
191. 711 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
192. Id. at 327.
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issued it without using notice-and-comment rulemaking. 193 The D.C.
Circuit held that the schedule was within § 553's exception for procedural
rules. The court "put to one side cases like Batterton where a rule has
definite substantive consequences but can arguably be called either
'procedural' or 'substantive,' and a court must decide which it is. 194 In this
case, the court found it "hard to characterize the agency statement at
issue ... as anything other than a rule of 'procedure."'' 195 Nevertheless,
because "all procedural rules affect substantive rights to greater or lesser
degree," further inquiry was required to determine "whether the
substantive effect is sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are
needed to safeguard the policies underlying the APA."'196 The court
tailored the inquiry to the scheduling context:
When a rule prescribes a timetable for asserting substantive rights, we think
the proper question is whether the time allotted is so short as to foreclose
effective opportunity to make one's case on the merits. This standard allows
an agency ample discretion to structure its proceedings as it sees fit.
However, when an agency abuses that discretion by creating extreme
procedural hurdles that foreclose fair consideration of the underlying
controversy, a court, by remanding for notice and comment, can ensure that
the agency explores the substantive consequences of its "procedural" rule. 197
Comparing the details of the standard and expedited schedules for the
ICC railroad merger review under this foreclosure standard, the court
concluded that the competitor railroads' opportunity to file responsive
applications with the ICC had not been unduly abridged. Were it not for
the Batteron default in favor of treating agency rules as matters for notice-
and-comment (i.e., as substantive), one imagines the court would not have
gone to such lengths to ensure that the plainly procedural rule at issue had
only modest substantive effects. 198
193. Id.
194. Id. at 328.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Nat'l Whistleblower Ctr. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 208 F.3d 256,
263 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) "unavoidable
and extreme circumstances" standard for granting leave to file late papers in the license
renewal proceedings for the Calvert Cliffs nuclear facility and applying the Lamoille
approach, on the ground that the NRC "standard did not foreclose participation by third
parties seeking to intervene in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding").
198. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing the time within which to serve a summons); 6(a)
(providing rules for computing time under the Rules); 6(c)(1) (providing that, generally, a
written motion must be served at least fourteen days before the noticed hearing date); 12(a)
(providing times within which an answer must be filed, depending upon stated criteria). I
could go on, but you get the point. If any of these time period Rules were challenged under
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In American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 199 a group of hospitals challenged a
series of directives, transmittals, and guidelines that the Department of
Health & Human Services (HHS) issued in the wake of a 1982 change to
the Medicare program. Congress enacted a new review program using
peer review organizations (PROs) to "crack down on excessive
reimbursements to hospitals for treatments of Medicare patients. '200
Enacting only a "skeletal" framework, "Congress left much of the specifics
of the hospital-PRO relationship to the inventiveness of HHS, empowering
it to promulgate regulations governing PROs in order to implement the
peer review program." 20 1 HHS issued numerous rules, but without using
notice and comment. An association representing 6,000 member hospitals
sued to invalidate the rules. The D.C. Circuit began by affirming "that
Congress intended the exceptions to § 553's notice and comment
requirements to be narrow ones": "In light of the obvious importance of
these policy goals of maximum participation and full information, we have
consistently declined to allow the exceptions itemized in § 553 to swallow
the APA's well-intentioned directive." 20 2 Drawing on Batterton and other
cases, the court explained that it "ha[d] generally sought to distinguish
cases in which an agency is merely explicating Congress' desires from those
cases in which the agency is adding substantive content of its own." 203 It
then described this approach to the exception for procedural rules as
"inquiring more broadly whether the agency action," in addition to having
a substantial impact on parties, "also encodes a substantive value judgment
or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on a given type of behavior." 204
The court analyzed the series of directives at issue in the case in great
detail, concluding that each of them was exempt from notice and
comment. 205
Batterton, Lamoille, and Bowen together established a framework for
scrutinizing agency rules with an eye toward strongly protecting public
participation in agency formulation of the rules designed to regulate
people's primary conduct out in the world, and not merely secondary
the REA, they would surely pass muster under Hanna and Burlington Northern without the
need to conduct anything like Lamoille's fair-consideration-foreclosure standard under the
APA. And that is as it should be, for the REA and APA use a substance-procedure
distinction for quite different purposes.
199. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
200. Id. at 1041.
201. Id. at 1043.
202. Id. at 1044.
203. Id. at 1045; see also id. at 1047 (quoting "critical feature" language from Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
204. Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1047.
205. Id. at 1048-57.
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conduct in presenting a matter to the agency. Thus, for example, in JEM
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,20 6 the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC was not
required to use notice and comment to promulgate a set of "stringent
application processing rules designed to streamline the agency's review" of
a large number applications for 689 newly allotted commercial frequency
modulation (FM) channels.20 7 Citing Batterton, LamoilLe, and Bowen, the court
reasoned that "a license applicant's right to a free shot at amending its
application is not so significant as to have required the FCC to conduct
notice and comment rulemaking, particularly in light of the Commission's
weighty efficiency interests." 208 Moreover, the new rules "did not change
the substantive standards by which the FCC evaluates license applications, e.g.,
financial qualifications, proposed programming, and transmitter location." 20 9
By contrast, in Chamber of Commerce v. United States Department of Labor,210 the
D.C. Circuit invalidated an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) directive that placed "12,500 relatively dangerous
workplaces" on a new "primary inspection list," with a guaranteed
"comprehensive inspection before the end of 1999," at the same time the
agency promised to remove a workplace from the list-thereby "reduc[ing]
by 70 to 90 percent the probability that it [would] be inspected"-f "it
adopt[ed] a comprehensive safety and health program designed to meet
standards that in some respects exceed[ed] those required" by statute.2 1'
OSHA issued the directive without notice and comment, and the court held
this defect invalidated the rule because the rule was substantive. Drawing
explicitly, again, on Batterton and Bowen, as well as JEM, the court reasoned
that "[t]he Directive is intended to, and no doubt will, affect the safety
practices of thousands of employers. The value of ensuring that the OSHA
is well-informed and responsive to public comments before it adopts a
206. JEM, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
207. Id. at 322. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had dismissedJEM's
application for a station, and would not permitJEM to refile, when it determined thatJEM's
appfication provided conflicting geographic coordinates for its proposed transmitter site in
violation of the rules. Id. at 323.
208. Id. at 327.
209. Id. Similarly, in James V Hurson Associates v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir.
2000), the court upheld against a § 553 attack a United States Department of Agriculture
rule cancefing an in-person-meeting method it had used for granting quicker approval of a
producer's proposed food safety label. Quoting liberally from JEM, the court held that
"[t]he agency's abolition of face-to-face [meetings] did not alter the substantive criteria by
which it would approve or deny proposed labels; it simply changed the procedures it would
follow in applying those substantive standards." Id. at 280-8 1.
210. 174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
211. Id. at 208.
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policy is therefore considerable. '" 212
Batterton and its progeny do yeoman service in protecting the public's
right to participate when the typical federal agency writes a substantive
rule, the very goal that § 553 sets in distinguishing substantive from
procedural rules for notice-and-comment treatment. But these cases have
nothing to teach us about the scope of the Patent Office's rulemaking
power, which binds the public only when deployed with notice-and-
comment and which must avoid substantive patent policy even with the
most punctilious notice-and-comment. The enabling act approach is a far
better fit for the Patent Act, because it is tailored closely to the goal of
enabling the Patent Office to make rules reasonably calculated to establish
or preserve a fair and effective examination process for applicants, while at
the same time prohibiting any glaring invasions of Congress's substantive
patent policy turf.
C. The Rules of Decision Act's Substance-Procedure Distinction
The Rules of Decision Act (RDA) provides that "[t] he laws of the several
states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States." 213 The text is identical in substance to its predecessor
in the Judiciary Act of 1789,214 even as so much else around it has changed.
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,215 a diversity case, the Supreme Court held that
the RDA requires federal courts to apply not only state positive law, but
also state decisional law. 216 Federal courts also, at the same time, apply
federal procedural law, even in diversity cases. Indeed, "[t]he rules that
were developed under the authority of the [REA] were adopted by the
Supreme Court on December 20, 1937, and took effect on September 1,
1938, less than five months after Erie was handed down." 217
The RDA thus sets up its own substance-procedure distinction: "Under
the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive
212. Id. at 212.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). The Rule of Decision Act's (RDA's) full text is quoted
supra, note 3 1.
214. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 ("And be it further enacted, That the
laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.")
215. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
216. Id. at 78. The same is true when state law supplies the rule of decision for a claim
as to which a federal court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988).
217. Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2002).
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law and federal procedural law." 218 How does this distinction play out, and
might it help us work out an approach to determining the scope of the
Patent Office's regulatory power? The breadth and depth of the Erie
jurisprudence and commentary is staggering. 219 Even a modest exploration
of the materials would take us far beyond the scope of this Article. But a
small number of its settled principles suffice to show that Erie's choice-of-
law framework offers no help at all in sorting procedural from substantive
Patent Office rules under § 2(b) of the Patent Act.
In Erie itself, the operative question was the scope of a railroad's duty to
a person who was injured by a passing train while walking along the
railroad's right of way.22° As the Seventh Circuit recently observed, this
was an "obvious rule[] of substance," 221 and the Supreme Court held that
Pennsylvania state tort decisions supplied the rule of decision in the case.
222
In Hanna, as I described earlier,223 the operative question was the manner of
serving process. The Massachusetts statute that would have applied in state
court conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, with which the
diversity plaintiff had fully complied.2 24 The Supreme Court opined that
"[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question
facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice."2 25 Where there is a Federal Rule on point, "the court has been
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the
Advisory Committee, th[e Supreme] Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the
terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." 226 These polar
218. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). For a recent
application of the Erie doctrine in the circuit courts, see Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp.,
441 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).
219. For an excellent start, the interested reader should consult Adam N. Steinman,
What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial
Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245 (2008).
220. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1938).
221. Houben, 309 F.3d at 1033.
222. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
223. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
224. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1965).
225. Id. at 471; see also id. at 473 ("Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-
recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even
though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules."); Erie, 304
U.S. at 92 (Reed, J, concurring) ("The fine between procedural and substantive law is hazy
but no one doubts federal power over procedure."). This collision vel non between federal
rule and state law is the question that sharply divided the Supreme Court in the Shady Grove
case. See supra note 122.
226. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1987) ("In Hanna v. Plumer, we set forth the appropriate test for resolving conflicts between
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cases are relatively straightforward.
Middle cases have presented a deeper challenge. "The Court's first
effort to grapple with the middle ground came in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, [227] in which it had to decide whether a state statute of limitations
barred a claim brought for breach of trust." 2 8 Applying what it would later
call "'[o]utcome-determination' analysis, '229 the York Court concluded that
the state limitations statute applied: "The question is ... does it significantly
affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a
State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the
same parties in a State court?" 230
The York approach did not last, however, for it "swept too much under
state law." 231 Hanna adjusted York by refracting it back through Erie's policy
lens. "The 'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 232 This
Hanna gloss on York established the anti-forum-shopping approach that the
Supreme Court continues to follow in such "unguided Erie choice" cases. 233
Each of these moves-from Erie to York to Hanna and beyond-is, in its
state law and the Federal Rules. The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly
construed, the scope of Federal Rule 38 is sufficiently broad to cause a direct collision with
the state law or, implicitly, to control the issue before the court, thereby leaving no room for
the operation of that law. The Rule must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of
Congress' rulemaking authority, which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed
on this Court by the Rules Enabling Act." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
227. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
228. Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2002).
229. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466.
230. 326 U.S. at 109.
231. Houben, 309 F.3d at 1034; see also Ely, supra note 20, at 709 ("But although it held
sway for quite a time, rork's outcome determination test seemed overbroad.").
232. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
233. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1996);
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-53 (1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980); see
also AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reins. Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir.
2003) ("[]he distinction between 'substantive' issues and 'procedural' issues in cases
applying the doctrine first announced in Erie... should be understood as shorthand for a
more complex inquiry. That inquiry requires courts to refer to the twin aims of the Erie
doctrine, which are to discourage forum-shopping and to avoid the inequitable
administration of laws." (citation omitted)); Steinman, supra note 219, at 265 ("For the last
forty years (since Hanna), the Supreme Court has consistently stated that such choices must
be made with reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws. If federal judicial lawmaking would
disserve these two policies, then the federal court must follow state law." (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted)).
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way, the stuff of nuance and filigree, subject to heartfelt debate among
judges and scholars. But the broad outline recounted here, at least, is
uncontroversial.
The RDA, and the Erie jurisprudence implementing it, focus on
preventing forum shopping between the state and federal courts, and the
frictions such forum shopping can produce. This policy response has no
bearing on the Patent Act context, for the simple reason that obtaining a
U.S. patent offers no prospect of forum shopping. There is one, and only
one, forum in which to obtain a U.S. patent as a matter of right, and that
forum is the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. No amount of judicial
parsing of substantive from procedural Patent Office rules under § 2(b) can
change this fact.
CONCLUSION
Two years after Erie and the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Professor Thomas Green quipped that "[t]he answer to the question, 'What
is procedure?' depends upon the answer to another question, 'Why do you
want to know?"' 234 This is functionalism, not fatalism. And a functional
approach to the patent law version of the question-what is a procedural
rule for purposes of § 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act?-takes cognizance of the
basic allocation of substantive and procedural roles that Congress made
when it split the patent power in 1790. The primary rigors of congressional
oversight permit the courts to serve as a secondary backstop, affording the
Office substantial freedom to treat as procedural the matters it finds in the
twilight zone between clear procedure and clear substance. A court should
thus uphold a Patent Office rule against a § 2(b)(2)(A) attack where the
Office can explain how the rule reasonably helps the Office establish or
preserve a fair and effective examination process for applicants,
notwithstanding an incidental effect on applicants' substantive patent rights.
234. Green, supra note 1, at 483.
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